RISKVUE ARCHIVE | RISK BITES

Kidnap and Ransom:
Crisis Management — An Actual Kidnap Incident (Part 2 of 2)

By Daniel W. Houston

This is the second of a series of articles relative to kidnap and ransom.

Senior management at the world headquarters in the United States had prepared for months for its worldwide country manager’s meeting. It was now Saturday morning and a number of managers had already arrived for the Sunday 6:00 p.m. “kick-off” meeting. The telephone rang at the chairman’s home. James Smith (not his real name) has been kidnapped.

James Smith, country manager in a South American country, heard the news announcements driving to and from work and at home, warning “alter your route to work … do not develop travel habits … call in periodically….” Despite the news announcements; that he had noticed a road work truck parked on his street as he left for his office at 6:45 a.m.; that he was a native and that he knew several people that had been kidnapped, he felt safe.

Following his usual routine, (80% of kidnappings occur when resident employees drive home to work) Mr. Smith left the office at noon to have lunch at his home. Taking his usual route, Mr. Smith heard the same news announcements/warnings. He again noticed the work truck parked on his street (a period of surveillance always precedes a kidnapping). He was not a difficult target. Suddenly, the truck lunged into his path, hitting his car and blocking his way. Automatic weapons were everywhere. Mr. Smith’s face was hooded and the three or four abductors sped away in his vehicle. The work truck was later learned to be a stolen vehicle.

Mr. Smith’s secretary later stated that while she was returning to the office from lunch she noticed her “boss’ ” car driving toward the airport. The driver was wearing a blond, women’s wig. Later that afternoon she received the first telephone call from the kidnappers — they made their demand clear, $3 million (average demand) for her boss’ release. And it must be in U.S. dollars. Thinking quickly, she taped the conversation.

Saturday, 9:00 a.m., the treasurer telephoned the director of risk management and insurance with the news and wanted to know, “Where is the insurance policy? How much insurance do we have? Who should we contact?”

Within 20 minutes the director of risk management and insurance arrived at the world headquarters, removed the policy from its separate locked file and was greeted in the “war room” by senior management. The kidnap negotiation firm was telephoned and codes were exchanged. Immediately, travel arrangements were made for one member of the negotiation firm to meet at the world headquarters that afternoon and a second to assess the situation on the ground — in the South American country.

Over the next 30 days, a vast amount of information was gathered and negotiations were steady.

It was learned, early on, that the kidnappers were a criminal group, as opposed to a professional, religious or political group and most likely were police or former police. Realizing this, a short time frame would be set.

The kidnappers usually telephoned at or near noon, rather than dusk or nighttime.

Mr. Smith’s family was moved to another country, as was the custom in these cases at the time, due to possible threats being made against other family members.

It was learned that Mr. Smith was being held in an urban setting.

Senior executives in the U.S. were impatient; most were North Americans and had a linear thought process (cause/effect).

The kidnap negotiators were thinking similar to the culture of the kidnappers with which they were dealing. The negotiators knew that time would permit the kidnappers to become tired — perhaps restless — and make mistakes.

A local attorney (the kidnappers trusted and preferred to enter negotiations) was chosen to communicate with the kidnappers.

The kidnap negotiators analyzed the motives of the kidnappers, listening carefully to the words and intonations on the taped conversations. They also considered the interests of the victim (strengths/weaknesses), the family, the kidnappers, the company, the communicator, the government, embassy officials, etc.

The negotiators knew that if payment was made too quickly or the amount paid too high, the kidnappers would think that they had an easy target and would kidnap other company personnel or remaining family members, or would “double dip” or “double tap,” asking for a second ransom before Mr. Smith was released.

Again, the kidnappers demanded that the ransom be paid in U.S. dollars; local currency would have been too heavy/bulky to carry, easy to “spot” and of lesser value.

In this case, after keen and extensive negotiations, the hostage was not physically harmed and after 31 days and $300,000 in U.S. currency (that was brought into the country), Mr. Smith was released. The intermediary (local attorney) netted an additional $15,000. Mr. Smith was transferred to another less risky South American country, where his family now lived. But this was not the end of the story.

Within days of his arrival in the new country, it was learned that he was on the underground’s hit list — claiming he was a “Yankee from the United States.” An additional $5,000 was paid to an infiltrator who “leaked” that Mr. Smith was actually a native and citizen of a South American country. He was removed from the list. 

Read Kidnap and Ransom (Part 1)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Daniel W. Houston is Senior Vice President and Risk Management Practice Leader for Hilb, Rogal and Hamilton (insurance brokers and risk management consulting). His office is located in Atlanta, Georgia.

riskVue | The webzine for risk management professionals
April 2003